In his last major publication, Edmund Husserl refers to his phenomenology in terms of a “methodical working philosophy.” (1) In his eyes, phenomenology is a methodical tool which allows us to deal with “the fertile soil” of experience. But should this fertile soil not be “leached out” after more than a decade of intensive phenomenological investigation carried out by Husserl and his predecessors? In what sense is the field of experience an infinite task for phenomenological inquiry and in what sense is it possible to speak of a promising future for phenomenology? In order to answer this question one has to bear in mind the specific sphere in which transcendental-phenomenological analyses take place: namely, phenomenology operates within an area of conflict between life-world, science and several other perspectival attitudes toward the world. It is not only the task of phenomenology to describe the specific characteristics of these possible perspectives, but also to clarify their mutual relatedness. Therefore, phenomenology is a meta-science in a very specific way. It is not only the case that phenomenology operates on a meta-level (as, for example, naturalism or social constructivism do), phenomenologists restrict themselves to a description of the very conditions of the possibility of world- and self-directedness as such. Thus, phenomenology has to be regarded as a non-objectifying meta-science.
But does this mean that phenomenological analysis is carried out from an archimedic point? Can we ever be immune against a blind spot of theoretical inquiry? Certainly not. As a matter of fact, phenomenology itself is an attitude towards the world. Even the phenomenological reduction does not free us from applying the same critical strictness we are directing at the positive sciences to ourselves as well. Properly understood, the performance of the phenomenological reduction is an ongoing process of radical self-critique. In other words: the performance of the reduction is tantamount to the recognition of the necessary existence of a blind spot in every theoretical and non-theoretical engagement within the world. Therefore, the phenomenological analysis of “the things themselves” is only one part of the story. The diligent reflection of one’s own presuppositions is equally important. Thus, phenomenology always has to be supplemented by a “phenomenology of phenomenology” (2) under the banner of the dictum of presuppositionlessness.
Accepting these methodological prerequisites, the answer to the question of why the fertile soil of experience is an infinite task becomes evident: the fields of phenomenological investigation (life-world, science and all other special attitudes) are subjected to constant changes due to innovation, conflict and transience. But this means that the same holds true for phenomenology itself: phenomenology is no fixed system consisting of eternal truths. Moreover, the objects of phenomenological analysis are part of a flux of modification too. But does that mean that all phenomenological work is only provisional? To be sure, phenomenology is and has to be a transcendental endeavour which seeks to unveil a priori structures of subjective world-directedness. These structures are part and parcel of any phenomenological theory in two ways: on the one hand, they have to be regarded as a guideline for the methodical bias of phenomenology. The central building blocks such as the theory of evidence, the reductions (both the transcendental-phenomenological and the eidetic), constitution etc. are by no means theoretical constructions — they are derived from these subjective a priori structures which are already operative in every practical world involvement.
On the other hand, the basic characteristics of the subjective are responsible for certain patterns of problems which constantly recur in different historical forms and on various levels of theoretical inquiry. The relation between relativism and relativity, which we want to address cursorily in the following, is an example for such a pattern.
If we take a look at the ways the relation between relativism and relativity is usually addressed in philosophy and the sciences, we see with clarity the necessity for phenomenological reflection. First, there is a need for a clarification of the implicit presuppositions of the positive sciences and their methodological paradigms. Second (and as a subsequent step), phenomenology has to deal with the proper analysis of concrete phenomena, as long as they belong to the field of possible phenomenological description, i.e., as long as they are treated as intentional contents. It is our conviction that only a combination of these two levels of philosophical analysis makes the future of a phenomenological movement a successful endeavour. It is neither enough to treat phenomenology purely from a historical point of view nor to reduce phenomenology to an immanent discourse on its own methodology and highly specific problems which arise from inner-phenomenological prerequisites. Nor does it suffice to detach a phenomenological treatment of concrete problems from its methodological foundations, for one has to accept that phenomenology is method to a great extent. To get this point right, it is of course necessary to conduct phenomenology on all of these levels without always being forced to address concrete applications of purely historical or methodological investigations. But if we consider phenomenology as a broad and far-reaching project in contemporary philosophy and if we take seriously what phenomenology tells us about the conditions of any theoretical inquiry (i.e., the relation between praxis and theory, between object and attitude, etc.) all special niches of phenomenological research have to be brought together in fruitful dialogue.
After these rather programmatic statements, let us try to sketch a concrete example in which the close relation between the theoretical threat of relativism and the evidence of relativity, as well as the multi-dimensionality of phenomenological analysis, get explicit: it is not only due to philosophical reasons but also due to political, social, demographic and ethical concerns that the question of how to deal with the encounter of the cultural Other has received such immensive attention in the last decades. The problem of interculturality, as it is often portrayed within philosophical discourse, lies in the following question: could it be that whenever I think I have understood a culturally diverse Other, the only one I have really understood is myself, i.e., my cultural or historical background? The culturally diverse Other appears as — so to speak — the reincarnation of the ancient sceptical theme which has troubled philosophy ever since. To be sure, this question is relevant not only with regard to the problem of translation. It is not only the question of Quine’s (3) and Davidson’s (4) field linguist, it is also the question of whether it is possible to speak of truth in a traditional sense or to hang on to one of our most basic intuitions: that there is one world we all share at least in its basic structures. From a phenomenological point of view, this traditional setting has to be commented on with respect to two different levels of argumentation: on a pragmatic level, there is no radical problem of interculturality. We have never heard of an anthropologist who returned from a field study and reported that she understood simply nothing. This means that the problem of radical intercultural relativism is a philosophical problem and has to be treated exactly as such. On a theoretical level, the experience of cultural relativity can be — as Husserl himself suggested in the Crisis — the starting point for a radical change of attitude. Instead of asking for criteria of translation, the validity of “principles of charity,” etc., one can radicalise the scope of critique and thus enter the phenomenological attitude. The self-restriction of the reduction alters the theoretical interest from the questions of what the objects are to how they can be given. After the reduction is performed we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the correlations between the givenness of certain objects and the possible modes of how they can be intended. The temporary exclusion of the transcendent opens the gate to the level of the transcendental. Within this transcendental sphere a clarification of the basic modes of world-reference, the reflection on certain formal eidetic insights and a description of the correlations between attitudes (e.g., the scientific attitude, the aesthetic attitude, the attitude of every-day praxis) and objects take place. To be sure, on this transcendental level, phenomenology can only provide us with an understanding of what it means to speak of an object, of a human action, of symbolic reference, of meaning etc. However, it is obvious that there are, for example, highly different forms of symbolic reference in the history of mankind and within several cultural spheres. The comparison and systematisation of these forms is an empirical endeavour, whereas transcendental phenomenology limits the scope in which speaking of “reference” makes sense at all.
This distinction between empirical investigations and transcendental reflection gives us an idea of what we mean by the distinction between “relativism” and “relativity.” In providing the essential structure of reference (or any other phenomenon in question) which is not historically, socially or culturally relative, phenomenology implicitly battles the presuppositions of relativism without reducing the manifold of concrete life-forms to an amorphous unit. It is important to show the fallaciousness of relativist positions (implicit or explicit) on a formal level. In order to do so, phenomenology has to identify certain unacceptable presuppositions which unavoidably lead to such positions. But proofs of this kind do not suffice. It is not enough to repeat the arguments Husserl has already formulated in his Logical Investigation: bringing to the fore the formal deficiency of certain presuppositions only paves the way to much more challenging tasks. Here, a phenomenological investigation of interculturality has to account for a meaningful concept of culturally relative frameworks. This means that these frameworks have to be treated as concrete life-worlds which are bound to concrete living subjects. In highlighting this basic relation between subjectivity and concrete life-world not only can the meaningless picture of many separated worlds be avoided, but, apart from that, it becomes possible to address the question of relativity at its very source: i.e., at the moment of encounter with a concrete alter ego (be it the tribesman, my neighbour or my historical self).
On this level of argumentation we are concerned with the facticity of human encountersand not so much with the abstract collision of anonymous systems of belief. Here, once again, the inadequate ways of posing the problem within traditional philosophical discourse become evident. Usually, the problem of the “Other” is formulated in terms of an “asymmetry of access”: whereas I “know” that I have mental states on the one hand and behaviour on the other, all I can “know” about the Other is her “output,” i.e., her behaviour. All I can do is to presuppose a certain similarity between me and the Other and to infer that the Other has to have a mental life too. However, such “arguments from analogy” are incorrect on at least three levels: first, arguments of this kind already go astray for formal reasons. If it were really the case that my mental states, my actions and the actions of the Other were given, the only possible (and quite absurd) conclusion would be that the Other is a marionette of my mental states. There is no formal correct way to infer the existence of mental states of Others. Second, and much more important, the very setting of this argument has to be rejected: differentiations between actions and mental states are theoretical constructions which can never be proven in direct intuition. Embodied subjectivity has to be understood in terms of expressive units and not in terms of inadequate distinctions between “inner” and “outer.” Third, even recent studies in developmental psychology challenge the view that we have to apply knowledge about analogies and inferences in order to recognise an Other. Otherwise we could not explain why, for example, babies recognise their mothers even at an age where one would not expect them to be in possession of any theoretical concepts.
Consequently, the relation between ego and alter ego is indeed asymmetric but in a very special sense. It is not a relation of knowledge versus inaccessibility but rather of mutual constitution. Maybe the most important insight of phenomenological analysis of Otherness is that the intentional content “Other” cannot be reduced to the constitutional abilities of the ego. First and foremost, the Other is constituted as constituting, i.e., as an acting, perceiving, etc., concrete alter ego. In recognizing the Other as an Other, I have to recognize myself as an Other for the Other. No matter if we are dealing with questions of interculturality and otherness from a purely theoretical, ethical or political point of view, phenomenological analysis goes back to the source of the phenomena in question instead of already starting with higher-order theoretical concepts. This, however, does not mean that phenomenology has to restrict itself to this level. Rather than that, one is not able to harvest the apples of the tree of science until the fertile soil of experience has been sufficiently tilled. (5)
Notes
(1) Husserl, E., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Husserliana VI, p. 104].(Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1970), p. 100
(2) Husserl, E., Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion, Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926-1935), ed. by Sebastian Luft [Husserliana XXXIV] (Kluwer: Dordrecht, Boston & London, 2002), p. 176.
(3) Quine, W. V. O., Word and Object (Cambridge The MIT Press, 1973), p. 26 ff.
(4) Davidson, D., Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 125 ff.
(5) This essay is part of a project which is carried out with support from the FWF (Austrian Science Fonds), Project-Number: P18395-G04.