Harold Demsetz, 1930-

Early developer of R.H. Coase's theory of property rights. His 1967 paper argued that the allocation of property rights was a precondition for the efficient functioning of markets. Demsetz pursued these "Chicago"-style concerns - i.e. locating the emergence of institutions such as property rights, contracts, firms, oligopolistic behavior etc. in transactions costs and information problems. Demsetz's 1972 paper with Alchian was one of the earliest analyses of the "principal-agent" problem.

Major Works of Harold Demsetz

• "Toward a Theory of Property Rights" 1967, AER
• "Why Regulate Utilities?", 1968, J Law Econ
• "Information and Efficiency: another viewpoint", 1969, J Law Econ
• "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization", with A. Alchian, 1972, AER
• "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy", 1973, J Law Econ
• "Accounting for Advertising as a Barrier to Entry", 1979, J of Business

Resources on Harold Demsetz

• Demsetz's homepage at UCLA.
• Hubbard's "Notes on Alchian and Demsetz" at UCLA. See also this.